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Introduction
A commonly received idea, one strengthened by the post-war debates about
the nature of totalitarianism, is that “extremes meet.” Rather than a straight
line between the Left and Right poles, the political spectrum would look more
like a circle, or a “horseshoe,” a metaphor the philosopher Jean-Pierre Faye
used to describe the position of German parties in 1932, from the Nazis to the
Communists.1 And because it focused on the “antidemocratic” and “poten-
tially fascistic individual,” Theodor Adorno and his colleagues’ pioneer study
The Authoritarian Personality,2 sparked a large body of research on “left-wing”
authoritarianism, from the early studies of Edward Shils, Hans Eysenck, and
Milton Rokeach3 to Bob Altemeyer’s repeated attempt to build a specific scale
measuring “revolutionary” conventionalism,4 and the more recent work by
Stanley Feldman and Karen Stenner.5
This article proposes to revisit the convergence of the extremes theory,
focusing on the French case. France has a long tradition of political extremism
going back to the Revolution of 1789 and the Counter Revolution to which it
gave birth. The strength of the extreme Right, and more recently the extreme
Left, makes France an exception in Europe. In the first round of the 2002 pres-
idential election, the cumulated scores of the two far-right candidates, Jean-
Marie Le Pen and Bruno Mégret, and of the three Trotskyist candidates, Arlette
Laguiller, representing Lutte ouvrière (LO), Olivier Besancenot for the Ligue
communiste révolutionnaire (LCR), and Daniel Gluckstein for the Parti des
travailleurs (PT), amounted to some 30 percent of the votes (Figure 1).6 In the
last presidential election, this proportion fell to 20 percent; but Olivier Besan-
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cenot maintained his 2002 level (4.1 percent compared to 4.3) and alone did
better than the three other candidates of the extreme Left together (2.9 per-
cent). His rising scores, his growing popularity, and the early dynamic of the
Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (NPA) launched to replace the old LCR (June
2008–February 2009),7 have restarted a debate about the similarities between
extremes, some seeing Besancenot as a populist “Le Pen of the Left.”8
Figure 1. Presidential scores of the extreme Left and extreme Right candidates
Source: Official results France (overseas included).
I will try to answer some of the questions raised at the electoral level, com-
paring the voters of Le Pen and Besancenot in the 2007 presidential election.
After a rapid presentation of the French political extremes, I will show that
divergent social and political logics are at work to explain the electoral support
for these two candidates, drawing from the first two waves of the French Elec-
toral Panel 2007.9 Their voters do not occupy the same political space, they do
not have the same social background, and they do not hold the same values. 
Extreme Left and Extreme Right in France in 2007
Studies of political parties often variously refer to the “radical” Left or Right.
In France, however, the term is confusing, associated with the oldest French
party, the Parti républicain radical et radical-socialiste (1901), which held a
centrist and stabilizing position on the French political scene during the Third
and Fourth Republics.10 We will use the term “extreme” instead, adopting a
spatial definition.11 Since the Revolution of 1789, French political space has
been structured by the Left/Right cleavage. In the first wave of the 2007 sur-
vey, interviewees were asked to place themselves, then the main candidates,
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on a ten-point scale where “zero” denoted extreme Left, “ten” extreme Right,
and the points in between allowed for a more moderated judgment. Some 95
percent of the sample placed themselves and the main candidates on the
scale.12 The higher the score a person or a candidate received, the more right-
wing he or she was. In that sense, Le Pen was clearly located on the extreme
Right and Besancenot on the extreme Left. The former got the highest score,
far ahead of the other right-wing candidates (9.1 versus 7.7 for Nicolas Sarkozy,
and 5.4 for the centrist François Bayrou). When the question was worded
explicitly, as in the 2002 French Electoral Panel asking respondents to place
Jean-Marie Le Pen in relation to the extreme Left, the Left, the Center, the
Right or the extreme Right, 86 percent opted for “extreme Right.” Symmetri-
cally, Olivier Besancenot in 2007 was located at the extreme left of the politi-
cal axis, with a score of less than two on the Left-Right scale, lower than the
anti-globalization candidate José Bové and the Socialist Ségolène Royal (2.5
and 3.8 percent).13
These two denominations have different connotations. “Extreme Right” is
an infamous label, associated in the French collective memory with Nazism
and Fascism, the collaborationist Vichy regime, and the extermination of Jews.
Le Pen fiercely rejects it, calling himself a “populist” and proud to be so.14 But
ever since his comments about the gas chambers as a “detail” in the history of
World War Two in 1987, he has been assimilated to the extreme Right, and
considered by a large majority as a “danger for democracy.”15 The proportion
of voters who exclude the possibility of ever voting for his party has been ris-
ing, from 52 percent in 1984, at the beginning of its electoral emergence, to 65
percent in 1988, 72 percent in 1996, and 79 percent in 2002, after Le Pen qual-
ified for the second round of the presidential election.16 In the presidential
race of 2007, just before the first round, when the party seemed to be losing its
electoral influence, the proportion was still 62 percent.17
As for “extreme Left,” its origin varies from one country to another. In
France it mainly includes the parties and movements to the left of the Com-
munist Party (PCF). The Trotskyist family, the most important at the time of
the 2007 election, has its roots in the Fourth International, founded by Leon
Trotsky in 1938 to oppose the Stalinist Third International, which he saw as a
betrayal of the communist ideal; and French “leftists” vigorously opposed the
PCF during the May ’68 movement.18 But the public eye assimilates them to
the wider communist family and they suffer from the same rejection. In 1984,
at the time of the FN’s electoral emergence in the European elections, there
were more voters declaring that they would under no circumstances vote for
the LCR and the PCF than for the FN (respectively 58 and 57 percent versus 52
percent).19 The collapse of Communism and the increasing strength of radical
right-wing movements in Europe have changed the perspective. In 1988, for
the first time, the FN was more rejected than the Communist Party and the
extreme Left.20 On the eve of the 2007 presidential election, according to the
French Electoral Panel, the proportion of respondents who excluded the pos-
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sibility of ever voting for LO, the LCR or the PCF was respectively 28, 35, and
33 percent, compared to 62 percent for the FN. The image of the extreme Left
has mellowed, and it arouses far more sympathy than the extreme Right.21
The electoral dynamic of both extremes is also quite different. The
launching of the FN in 1972 by the group Ordre nouveau was meant to bring
together all the components of the extreme Right, from Vichy nostalgics to
Poujadists and supporters of Algérie Française, and provide an inroad to par-
liamentary politics. It was a complete failure until the Socialists won the 1981
elections and called four Communist ministers into the government, which
radicalized part of the right-wing electorate. After a series of successes in 1983
in by-elections such as in Dreux, the European elections of 1984 marked the
FN’s take-off. That year, the party attracted a part of the left-wing electorate
that had been disappointed by the liberal turn taken by the Socialists’ eco-
nomic policies after 1983. Between 1988 and 1998, the FN consolidated its
scores at a level of some 15 percent of valid votes, first in presidential ballots
(1988–1995) then in parliamentary and regional elections (1997 and 1998).
In spite of the internal crisis leading to a split in 1998–99,22 the 2002 presi-
dential election marked the culmination of the FN’s electoral ascent, a record
score of 16.9 percent qualifying Le Pen for the second round, instead of the
Socialist candidate. 
As for the extreme-left parties of Trotskyist persuasion, they have system-
atically presented candidates in the presidential elections of the Fifth Repub-
lic (Figure 1). But their electoral take-off came later, in the wake of the
disappointment caused by the policies of the center Left and the revitalization
of the social movement sector in the political context of the 1990s.23 In 1995,
Arlette Laguiller (LO) alone drew more than 5 percent of the vote and, in
2002, the scores of the three extreme-left candidates together amounted to
more than 10 percent. 
The 2007 presidential election took place in a different context, one that
limited the space available to the extremes. The memory of the “earthquake”
of 21 April 2002, when Le Pen qualified for the second round in the presiden-
tial election, along with a desire to renew the political class, led voters to
sweep away the older generation and to limit the number of votes dispersed to
small parties. There was a repolarization around Nicolas Sarkozy on the Right
and Ségolène Royal on the Left. From one election to the other, Le Pen lost one
million votes and his score dropped to 10 percent, his worst result in a presi-
dential race since 1974.24 As for the extreme Left, represented by Olivier Besan-
cenot for the LCR, Arlette Laguiller for LO, José Bové for the anti-globalization
movement, and Gérard Schivardi supported by the PT, its share of the votes
dropped to 7 percent. But its three-point loss was more limited than the
extreme Right’s (minus 6.5 points); and Olivier Besancenot’s score was almost
stable (minus 0.2 points). The number of voters he attracted even increased
(1.5 million, up from 1.2 million in 2002), confirming his leading position on
the far Left.25 On the whole, the share of the extreme Left in the total count of
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votes attracted by the Left increased, from some 5 percent until 1988 to 13.4
percent in 1995, 24 percent in 2002, and 26 percent in 2007.26
Antagonistic Political Positions
Three main models explain electoral behavior. The sociological one empha-
sizes the conformity of voters to the norms of the groups to which they
belong, to the weight of their social entourage and social networks. The psy-
cho-political model highlights the role of long-lasting attitudes (left-wing or
right-wing orientations, party identification) that structure perceptions of pol-
itics. The economic model stresses the strategic dimension of the electoral
decision, building on a reasoned evaluation of candidates and platforms. We
shall combine the three to show how different Le Pen and Besancenot voters
are in their partisan and ideological anchoring, as well as in their social con-
nections and their positions on candidates and issues. 
On the eve of the 2007 presidential election, the scores of these two
groups of voters on a ten-point Left-Right scale located them at opposite poles
of the political spectrum (Figure 2). Olivier Besancenot’s potential voters were
the most left-wing, with a score of 3.4; potential Le Pen voters were the most
right-wing, with a score of 7.2. Respondents’ self-location was coherent with
the way they placed their respective candidates, which in both cases were
actually perceived as a little more extreme than the respondents themselves:
the LCR candidate got a mean score of 2.5 among his supporters (0.9 points
less than the candidate’s), while Le Pen scored 9.2 among his (2 points more).
Figure 2. Left-Right placement of electorates and candidates in 2007
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007 wave 1.
The scores of the voters on a Left-Right 10-point scale are in black, the scores they give
their candidate in gray.
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The closer a person was to the left of the scale, the higher the chances of
a vote for the Trotskyist candidate, and the closer to the right, the more likeli-
hood of a vote for Le Pen (Figure 3). Olivier Besancenot did attract some right-
wing voters and, symmetrically, the voting intentions in favor of Jean-Marie
Le Pen rose slightly at the left end of the scale. But these deviant cases weighed
less than 10 percent in each candidate’s electorate.27 One must also take into
account the fact that respondents could locate themselves at the center of the
scale (position five) if they were unwilling to choose between Right and Left.
Asked whether they would describe themselves as “somewhat right-wing,”
“somewhat left-wing,” or “neither right- nor left-wing,” sixty-two percent of
the Besancenot voters and 56 percent of the Le Pen voters who located them-
selves in position five chose the answer “neither-nor.” But even if one excludes
them as well, the vast majority of Le Pen and Besancenot supporters still stand
at opposite poles of the political space. 
Figure 3. Votes for Besancenot/Le Pen by Left-Right placement
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007 wave 1.
Voting intentions weighted by results of 1st round. 
Their position on the Left-Right scale makes sense; it is coherent with
their other political characteristics such as their family political orientation,
their party identification, and their previous votes (Table 1). A series of ques-
tions allow to qualify the political leanings of the interviewees’ parents. The
subjects were asked if their father, their mother or their partner was “some-
what left-wing,” “somewhat right-wing,” or “neither left- nor right-wing.”
One can thus build two symmetric indicators, one of a left-wing environment,
one of a right-wing environment, varying between zero if neither father,
mother nor partner was left-wing (or right-wing) and three if father, mother
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and partner were left-wing (or right-wing). The majority of Besancenot’s vot-
ers were socialized in a left-wing family, and nearly half of Le Pen voters in a
right-wing family. 
In a multiparty system like that of France, with its experience of frequent
change, the question is not so much whether people “identify” with a party as
it is their degree of proximity to or distance from one, the usual question
being which party in a given list respondents feel closest to or least remote
from. For a long time the vote for the extreme Right was a candidate-centered
vote for Le Pen; his party by itself did not attract much support. But when
Bruno Mégret was its delegate-general, the party grew in size and visibility and
the proportion of Le Pen voters who also felt close to the FN rose from one
third in 1995 to 45 percent in 2002 (after Le Pen’s surprise qualification for the
second round), and then further to a record 50 percent in 2007.28 Between the
first rounds of the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections, Le Pen lost one fifth
of his voters. The French Electoral Panel data show that those who remained
faithful form the hard core of his electorate, the most convinced and therefore
most likely to have developed an attachment to the party.29 Those who did not
feel close to the FN either felt close to no party at all (almost a fifth) or to the
traditional Right (UMP, 10 percent; MPF, 3 percent) (Table 1). Only 14 percent
declared proximity to a left or an extreme-left party. Their past electoral
choices show the same pattern: they massively voted for Le Pen in the first
round of the 2002 presidential contest (82 percent), while only 6 percent
voted for left or extreme-left candidates (Table 1). 
Table 1. Political profile of Besancenot and Le Pen voters in 2007 (%)
Voting intentions for the first round Besancenot Le Pen Total
of the 2007 presidential election (N=232) (N=266) (N=3455)
Political background
≥1 left-wing father, mother, partner 63 30 52
≥1 right-wing father, mother, partner 28 49 39
Vote in 2002 (% valid votes)*
Extreme Left 49 2 10
Left 31 4 40
Right 15 11 36
Extreme Right 4 82 14
(31) (19) (20)
Party proximity
Extreme Left (LO, LCR) 36 5 7
Left (PC, PS, MRC, RG, Green) 31 9 38
Right (UDF, UMP, CPNT, MPF, other) 9 16 27
Extreme Right 1 51 5
None, NA 24 19 23
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007, wave 1, except “Social background” (wave 2, the only one
including questions about social origin.)   
* Population of voting age in 2002.
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The 2007 Besancenot voters also conform to a Left-Right logic (Table 1).
Only 10 percent feel close to a Right or extreme-right party, while 80 percent
voted for a Left or extreme-left candidate in 2002. But they differ from Le Pen
voters in two ways. Because they are younger (Table 2), they are less likely to
have formed any party attachment at all and less likely to have voted in the
2002 election. They appear much closer to the rest of the Left than extreme-
right voters do to the moderate Right. Almost as many Besancenot voters in
2007 felt close to the Socialists, the Communists or the Greens (31 percent) as
to an extreme-left party (36 percent, of whom 29 percent for Besancenot’s
party) (Table 1). The extreme-left scene is more fragmented than the extreme-
right; and its parties, especially the LCR, have been more active in the social
movements sector than in electoral politics. 
Table 2. Sociocultural profile of Besancenot and Le Pen voters in 2007 (%)
Voting intentions for the first round Besancenot Le Pen Total
of the 2007 presidential election (N=232) (N=266) (N=3455)
Demography
Women 48 46 53
< 40 years old 52 36 39
Educational achievement
≥Baccalaureate 41 22 41
University students 10 2 7
Socio-economic status
Unemployed 9.5 7. 5 7
Difficulties to cope with present income 70 70 59
Social Precariousness * 25 19 16
Profession (present or last one occupied)
Self employed 5 10 9
Upper and middle level salaried class 25 17 30
Clerical workers 31 30 27
Blue collar workers 27 37 24
Never worked 11 5 11
Social background
Father and/or mother working class 62 56 48
≥1working class link (self/father/mother) 70 68 56
Origin
≥1 foreign parent and/or grand  parent 30 15 26
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007, wave 1, except “Social background” (wave 2, the only one
including questions about social origin.)   
* Social precariousness index: respondents either unemployed or with fixed term contract and
finding it difficult to cope with their present income.
Distinctive Social Backgrounds
It is true that these two groups of voters share a disadvantaged socio-eco-
nomic status. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents who intended to vote for
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Besancenot, as well as more than two-thirds of potential Le Pen voters, were
blue-collar manual workers or non-manual clerical workers, both of which are
groups with low socio-economic status (Table 2). They also mostly came from
working-class families: 62 percent of Besancenot voters and 56 percent of Le
Pen voters had a blue-collar mother and/or father, while the average propor-
tion in the sample was less than half. On a global indicator taking into
account the occupation of the interviewee and of his or her parents, some 70
percent of Le Pen and Besancenot voters had at least one link with the blue-
collar world (as against 56 percent in the total sample). Seventy percent found
it hard to get by on their present income (Table 2). If one combines this eco-
nomic stress with the fact of being unemployed or having a fixed-term con-
tract, one gets an indicator of social precariousness, a condition that affects 15
percent of the 2007 French Panel sample, but one Lepenist voter out of five
and one Besancenot voter out of four. 
Yet if one looks more closely, differences do appear. Among Le Pen voters
there are more blue-collars belonging to the manual working class. One finds
more of the lower service class, the “post-industrial” proletariat, among Besan-
cenot supporters, a trend noted by Nathan Sperber in a detailed study of
extreme-left voting in 2002.30 Lepenist voters are older, the majority of them
over 40, and one quarter are retirees. The majority of Besancenot voters are
under 40, and only some 10 percent have retired. Being younger, they are also
more educated. Over 40 percent have at least the baccalaureate, the degree
that marks the end of high school in France, double the proportion found in
the Le Pen group; and 10 percent of Besancenot supporters were university stu-
dents at the time of the survey (as against some 2 percent of Le Pen voters).
Lastly, the Besancenot group is more multicultural, 30 percent of them have a
foreign parent or grandparent, twice as many as among Le Pen supporters. 
Contrasted Motivations 
The fact that the extreme Right and the extreme Left both are particularly hos-
tile to European integration is one of the arguments often used to emphasize
their convergence, as suggested by the provocative title of Dominique Reynié’s
book Le Vertige social-nationaliste: La gauche du Non et le référendum de 2005.31
Indeed, when asked how they voted in the referendum of 2005 on the Euro-
pean Constitution (Figure 4), respondents intending to vote for Le Pen or
Besancenot in 2007 both declared an exceptionally high level of “No” votes.
But the reasons behind the “No” were quite different. As Sylvain Brouard and
Vincent Tiberj have shown,32 left-wing voters in general defend the public ser-
vice and the welfare system against a European Union (EU) they associate with
big business and economic neo-liberalism; there is a social dimension to their
opposition, while Le Pen voters associate the EU with open borders and mas-
sive flows of immigration threatening French national identity. 
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Figure 4. 2007 voters declared votes in the referendum on the European
Constitution of 2005
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007, wave 1
One finds the same kind of contrast in 2007. When presented with a list
of problems and asked to select the two that would be most important for
them at the time of voting, Besancenot supporters put forward social issues.
Unemployment, social inequalities, and purchasing power were ranked first or
second by respectively 38, 35, and 27 percent of them.33 The hierarchy was dif-
ferent for Le Pen voters; they gave priority to the issue of immigration, fol-
lowed by unemployment and crime, chosen by respectively 49, 34, and 25
percent.34 A majority of both groups believed that their candidate offered the
best solutions on the issues that mattered most to them. If one compares the
choices of extreme-right and extreme-left voters to those of the sample at
large, computing for each issue the difference between the average answers
and those of Besancenot and Le Pen voters (Figure 5), the former stand apart
by the importance they attach to social inequalities and taxes, the latter by the
importance they give to immigration and crime. And both groups appear
almost systematically opposed on ten out of the thirteen issues. When one
rates an issue higher than the sample average, the other will rate it lower.
They clearly have antagonistic visions of the world.
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Figure 5. Most important problems in first round of the 2007 Presidential
election
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007, wave 1.
Deviation from the mean score of the issue in the sample. 
At a deeper level, these electoral choices are based on different value sys-
tems. For a long time, the Left/Right cleavage opposed two visions of the econ-
omy: a liberal right-wing view defending free trade and markets, and an
interventionist left-wing view calling for more state regulation. Then, in the
wake of the May ’68 social movement, a second socio-cultural dimension
started to gain weight, opposing supporters of an authoritarian and closed
society on the one side, and of an open and libertarian society on the other.
The trend can be seen in all of the most advanced industrial democracies,
where the level of education has increased, as well as the attachment to indi-
vidualist, “post-materialist” values.35 Today, traditional class voting based on
economic issues can conflict with “cultural” voting based on non-economic
issues.36 To measure these two dimensions one can build two scales. The “eco-
nomic liberalism” scale combines three questions, two on the positive or neg-
ative connotations attached to the words “profit” and “privatization,” and
one on the choice between two priorities in the coming years, improving
either “the situation of workers” or “the competitiveness of the French econ-
omy.” The “ethnocentrism-authoritarianism” scale comprises three questions,
about restoring the death penalty, not “feeling at home as one used to” in
one’s own country, and the impression that there are “too many immigrants”
in France.37 Because the majority of Besancenot and Le Pen voters are socially
disadvantaged, they are in favor of state control on social and economic issues,
and their scores are quite similar on our scale of economic liberalism (respec-
tively 4.1 and 4.9). Their scores contrast sharply, however, on the second scale.
Le Pen voters’ distinctive mark is their exclusionist stand and their demand for
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law and order. Ninety percent of them (as against one third of Besancenot vot-
ers) think there are “too many immigrants” in the country, 80 percent no
longer feel “at home” in France (as against 36 percent), and three out of four
want to restore the death penalty (as against one third). As a result, they get a
higher score than any other group of voters on the second scale, while Besan-
cenot voters score below average (7.7 versus 4).38
A Model Explaining Votes for the Extreme Left 
and Extreme Right
Values can conflict. In the specific context of the 2007 election, some consid-
erations weighed more than others when the time came to decide. To show
this, we did a multinomial logistic regression. This method selects among our
indicators those that have the strongest influence on electoral choice for the
extreme Left or the extreme Right. We limited our analysis to those who voted
for the main candidates: the Trotskyist Olivier Besancenot, the Socialist
Ségolène Royal, the centrist François Bayrou, the UMP (Union pour un mou-
vement populaire) candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, and the FN leader, Jean-Marie Le
Pen. The dependent variable was declared voting intention for the first round,
taking the vote for Sarkozy as the baseline modality, to which we could com-
pare the four other choices. The explanatory variables were the scores on our
three ideological scales―the ten-point Left-Right scale, the economic liberal-
ism scale, and the ethnocentrism-authoritarianism scale―combined with the
three socio-demographic variables of age, gender, and degree of educational
attainment.39 The model shows the most predictive factors in the choice
between these five candidates. 
If one only puts into the model the ideological scales, the three have a sta-
tistically significant impact on voting intentions for the first round (Table 3).
Position on the Left-Right scale is the best predictor of votes for all candidates
except Le Pen. Voting intentions in his favor do rise sharply as a voter’s posi-
tion approaches the far right of the scale, but the score on the scale of ethno-
centrism-authoritarianism is an even better predictor of such a choice. The
lead driver in support for Le Pen is fear of the “other,” at a level found in no
other voting group, while a low score on that scale is a strong predictor of
Socialist, centrist or extreme-left votes. Last, a low level of economic liberalism
(and conversely demand for state regulation) is the second best predictor of
votes for both the Socialist and the extreme-left candidates. Le Pen supporters
are far less concerned by economic issues; but contrasted with Sarkozy voters
(our baseline modality), they appear more interventionist. This explains why
one finds a significant negative correlation between scores on the economic
scale and support for the leader of the FN (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Logistic regression on the votes for Le Pen, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Royal,
and Besancenot
Votes in the 1st round of the 
2007 presidential election Predictors B Exp(B)
Constant 5.796
Left Right Scale (0-10) -1.034 .356
Besancenot Ethnocentrism-authoritarianism scale -.184 .832
Economic liberalism scale (1-8) -.452 .636
Constant 6.537
Left Right Scale (0-10) -.866 .421
Royal Ethnocentrism-authoritarianism scale -.198 .820
Economic liberalism scale (1-8) -.306 .736
Constant 3.654
Left Right Scale (0-10) -.451 .637
Bayrou Ethnocentrism-authoritarianism scale -.163 .849
Economic liberalism scale (1-8) -.164 .848
Constant -3.165
Left Right Scale (0-10) .180 1.197
Le Pen Ethnocentrism-authoritarianism scale .283 1.328
Economic liberalism scale (1-8) -.257 .774
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007, wave 1. 
Reference modality: Nicolas Sarkozy. All predictors are statistically significant at p<0.001.
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.48.
If one adds the socio-demographic variables, they have no statistically sig-
nificant effect,40 with the exception of age (and, to a lesser degree, education
and gender) in the case of Besancenot voters, and gender in the case of Le Pen
voters. Whatever their age, education or political orientation, women are
always more reluctant than men to support a movement like the FN, associ-
ated with a traditional vision of gender relations and surrounded by an aura of
violence. Besancenot’s radicalism attracts the younger generations born after
1968, who reached voting age at a time when the Communist Party had
ceased to be a credible alternative, and when the Socialist Party in office had
shown its limits. This is all the more true of those who have at most a basic
education or a post-high school vocational qualification insufficient to protect
them from precariousness and unemployment. Lastly, men are slightly more
likely to vote for Besancenot than women.41
As for the ideological variables, controlling for the socio-demographic
variables, the three of them retain a high and significant impact on voter
choice. The predicted probability of supporting Besancenot falls from 25 per-
cent among voters positioned at the extreme Left to less than 1 percent at the
extreme Right (while the probability of voting for Le Pen rises from 0 to 48
percent). The probability of supporting Le Pen varies above all in relation to a
voter’s scores on the scale of ethnocentrism-authoritarianism, rising from 0.4
percent among the interviewees with the lowest score to 33 percent among
those with the highest (Figure 6). When voting day draws near, these voters’
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main concern is toughness towards immigrants, and by association towards
delinquents, more than economic issues. The probability of choosing Besan-
cenot, on the other hand, depends more on both dimensions. It rises from two
percent among the strongest supporters of economic liberalism to 18 percent
among the most interventionist, and from 4 percent among the most author-
itarian and ethnocentric to 15 percent among those who have the lowest
scores on the scale (Figures 6-7). These voters have chosen Besancenot as much
for their desire for an open and more permissive society as for their distrust in
the market economy and private business and for their demand for a more
interventionist state. 
Figure 6. Voting intention for Besancenot/Le Pen by level of ethnocentric
authoritarianism
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007 wave 1
Predicted probabilities by score on scale
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Figure 7. Voting intention for Besancenot/Le Pen by level of economic
 liberalism
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007, wave 1.
Predicted probabilities by score on scale. 
To explore voters’ thought processes more deeply, the 2007 French Elec-
toral Panel proposed a list of words connected to current debates, about the
economy, immigration, Europe, etc. The respondents were asked whether each
word evoked for them something very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat
negative, or very negative. Two separate logistic regressions on the vote for Le
Pen and for Besancenot, using eight issues as vote predictors, confirm the con-
trast between the world of the extreme Right and that of the extreme Left
(Table 4).
Table 4. Logistic regression on the votes for Le Pen and Besancenot in 2007
Word evokes something “very 
negative”(1) to “very positive”(4) Le Pen Besancenot
B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Privatization +.176 .839 .390*** 1.477
Profit +.054 .948 -.046 1.047
Islam -.717*** 2.048 +.122 .885
European Union -.514*** 1.672 -.217** 1.242
Solidarity -.342*** 1.408 +.079 .924
Secularity -.288** 1.334 +.103 .902
35 hours week -.111 1.117 +.146 .864
National Identity +.271* .762 -.308*** 1.361
Constant +6.401 .002 +4.084 .017
Source: French Electoral Panel 2007, wave 1. The 8 items are reversed and considered as
ordinal variables.  *p<0.05, **p< 0.01,  ***p< 0.001. Pseudo R2: 0.22 and 0.06.
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All of these issues were statistically significant for predicting a Le Pen vote
in 2007 except economic issues (profit, privatization, hours of working week)
(Table 4). Voters most likely to cast a ballot for Le Pen are those who have a
negative image of Islam, or of the EU, who do not express solidarity with oth-
ers, who hold a negative image of secularism, and who valorize “national iden-
tity.” During the campaign, Sarkozy put forward the idea of a Ministry of
Immigration and National Identity, as part of a strategy to win back extreme-
right voters. But this issue was paradoxically less predictive than a plain aver-
sion to Islam,42 to “secularity,”43 or to “solidarity,” in line with the “national
preference” principle at the heart of the FN’s program. The level of support for
Le Pen rises from less than 1 percent if one has a very positive image of Islam
to 16 percent if it is very negative, and from 4 percent among those who have
a very positive image of secularity or solidarity to over 26 percent if it is very
negative. But it only rises from 5 to 11 percent depending on whether
“national identity” is perceived as very negative or very positive. 
For Besancenot supporters, in contrast, the economy matters a great deal.
The best predictor of such a vote is the extent to which one rejects “profit,” the
essence of capitalism, closely followed by one’s rejection of the issue of
“national identity.” The predicted probability goes from 3 or 4 percent among
those who have a positive image of these two words to respectively 12 and 14
percent when it is negative. Perception of the EU comes last, with the pre-
dicted probability of voting for the extreme Left rising from 5 percent among
those who have a positive image to 10 percent when it is negative. So the
extreme-left vote is as much a traditional “class vote” with a strong economic
dimension as it is a “cultural” vote, while the vote for Le Pen is more clearly a
“cultural” vote. 
Thus the intention to vote for Besancenot or Le Pen in 2007 resulted from
divergent social and political logics, which preclude an amalgam between the
two electorates. While both have tight links with the working-class world,
they do not attract the same workers. A generational, cultural, and ideological
gap separates them. Both groups see themselves at the poles of the Left-Right
scale, but at opposite poles. And they vote in the name of conflicting reasons
and values: social justice and equality for Besancenot’s voters, hierarchy and
exclusion for Le Pen’s. 
Conclusion
Since 2007 the political context has changed. The NPA’s low scores in the 2009
European elections and the 2010 regional elections (respectively 4.9 and 2.4
percent in the first round) started an internal crisis and a questioning of its elec-
toral strategy of “no alliance” with the rest of the Left. It is also faced with a
new competitor since the creation of a new party, the Parti de gauche (PG), in
November 2008 by the former Trotskyist and Socialist dissident Jean-Luc
Nonna Mayer116
Mélenchon, which did better in these two last elections (6 percent in the Euro-
pean elections and 5.9 percent in the first round of the regional elections, allied
with the Communists). Olivier Besancenot has decided not to run for the pres-
idential election of 2012, and voting intentions for the NPA’s new candidate,
Philippe Poutou, stay below 1 percent. As for the FN, on the contrary, its future
looks brighter after its fairly good results in the regional elections (with a score
of 11.7 percent allowing it to qualify for the second round in twelve regions),
and the increasing popularity of Marine Le Pen following her election to suc-
ceed her father as FN leader in the party congress of January 2011. For the next
presidential election, voting intentions for her have been steadily going up,
from 13 percent in November 2010 to 20 percent since May 2011.44
It is, of course, far too early to predict what will happen in 2012. Yet the
political preferences analyzed in this article show that potential NPA and FN vot-
ers remain socially and politically contrasted. Besancenot’s scores double among
young voters and the lower service class, and rise as one moves towards the left
of the political scale, reaching a peak (48 percent) among respondents close to
extreme-left parties. Le Pen’s scores rise among the elderly, the uneducated, the
unemployed, and also rise as one moves towards the right of the political scale,
with a peak among FN sympathizers (77 percent). Whatever may be the electoral
fortunes of the extreme Left and the extreme Right, whatever their past and
future ups and downs, one thing is sure: they do not meet.45
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